WILSON V. LAYNE: ALL THE WORLD'S A STAGE, BUT YOUR

HOME Is NOT
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
protects the American people from unreasonable government
searches and seizures.'
Although application of the Fourth
Amendment can generate confusion, the Amendment clearly
protects personal privacy by prohibiting unreasonable searches or
seizures by both federal and state law enforcement officers.3 The
Fourth Amendment was drafted partly in response to the writs of
assistance and general warrants carried out by British officials against
the colonists. 4 Accordingly, the fundamental principle of the sanctity
See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons to be seized.
Id.

1 JOHN WESLEY HALL, JR., SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 1:1, at 3 (2d ed. 1991)
[hereinafter 1 HALL] (arguing that "[n]owhere in the law have so few words
generated so much litigation and confusion" as does the Fourth Amendment).
3 See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967) (contending
that
"[t]he basic purpose of [the Fourth] Amendment, as recognized in countless
decisions of this Court, is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against
arbitrary invasions by government officials"); see also 68 Am. JUR. 2D Searches and
Seizures § 2 (1993) (noting that the core value of the Fourth Amendment, a value
unique to our civilization, is the protection of personal privacy from unwarranted
governmental intrusion); Eve Klindera, Note, Qualified Immunity for Cops (and Other
Public Officials) with Cameras: Let Common Law Remedies Ensure Press Responsibility, 67
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 399, 404 (1999) (arguing that "[t]he Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution protects private citizens from unreasonable government
interference with the right of privacy"); Note, Protecting Privacy Under the Fourth
Amendmen4 91 YALE L.J. 313, 313 (1981) [hereinafter Protecting Privacy] (stating that
"[t]he Fourth Amendment has explicitly been held to protect personal privacy since
at least the mid-nineteenth century"). The Fourth Amendment is applicable to the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.
See Wolf v.
Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949).
4 See Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 481 (1965). The Supreme Court
has
acknowledged the reaction of the colonists to the writs of assistance and how this
reaction shaped the contours of the Fourth Amendment. See id. The Stanford Court
contended that the Framers of the Fourth Amendment intended it to protect the
people from the unbridled authority associated with a general warrant. See id. The
Court declared that "[v]ivid in the memory of the newly independent Americans
2 See
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of the home, long recognized by the English and American
common
6
law,' is specifically protected by the Fourth Amendment.
The Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment7 requires
government officials, absent exigent circumstances, 8 to obtain a
were those general warrants known as writs of assistance under which officers of the
Crown had so bedeviled the colonists." Id. Writs of assistance were search warrants
issued to prevent trade with non-English sources in the American Colonies. See 1
HALL, supra note 2, § 1:3, at 6. The writs were prone to abuse because of their
general scope and long duration. See id. The use of both writs of assistance and
general warrants was a cause of the American Revolution. See id. at 9; see also Elsa Y.
Ransom, Home: No Place for "Law Enforcement Theatricals"--The Outlawing of
Police/Media Home Invasions in Ayeni v. Mottola, 16 Loy. L.A. ENT. L.J. 325, 331-32
(1995) (maintaining that the writs of assistance, which bestowed unbridled discretion
on revenue officers to carry out searches of homes and individuals, outraged the
American colonists).
See Semayne's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 195 (KB. 1604) ("[T]he house of every
one is to him as his castle and fortress."); see also 4 WmIuAM BLACysTONE,
COMMENTARIES *223 ("[T] he law of England has [s]o particular and tender a regard
to the immunity of a man's hou[s]e, that it [styles] it hi[s] castle, and will never
[s]uffer it to be violated with impunity."). Blackstone's writings won him instant
acclaim in England and the American Colonies. See GARYAMOS & RICHARD GARDINER,
NEVER BEFORE IN HISTORY 68 (1998). Blackstone had a significant impact on the
Founders of the Constitution, who cited Blackstone twice as frequently as they cited
John Locke. See id. Moreover, in Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 306-07 (1958),
the Court declared that "[f] rom earliest days, the common law drastically limited the
authority of law officers to break the door of a house to effect an arrest. Such action
invades the precious interest of privacy summed up in the ancient adage that a man's
house is his castle."; see also Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to
Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 220 (1890-1891) ("The common law has always
recognized a man's house as his castle, impregnable, often, even to its own officers
engaged in the execution of its commands.").
6 See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589 (1980) (asserting that the home is
the most clearly defined area of personal privacy); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,
428 U.S. 543, 561 (1976) (stating that private homes are afforded "the most stringent
Fourth Amendment protection"); Wyman v.James, 400 U.S. 309, 316 (1971) (noting
that historically the Supreme Court has been most protective of the privacy of the
home); United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951) (propounding that "[tlhe
Fourth Amendment prohibits both unreasonable searches and seizures, and its
protection extends to both 'houses' and 'effects'"); Marron v. United States, 275 U.S.
192, 195 (1927) (stating that general searches are plainly forbidden by the Fourth
Amendment and contravene fundamental rights); Edward G. Mascolo, Arrest
Warrants and Search Warrants in the Home: Payton v. New York Revisited and Modified
Under State Constitutional Law, 66 CONN. B.J. 333, 339 (1992) (stating that "a
fundamental principle of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is that the individual's
legitimate expectations of privacy from unreasonable searches and seizures are most
pronounced in the home").
7 See U.S. CONST. amend IV. The Warrant Clause states, "[N]o Warrants
shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." Id.
8 "Exigent circumstances" are defined as "[a] situation that demands unusual or
immediate action and that may allow people to circumvent usual procedures, as
when a neighbor breaks through a window of a burning house to save someone
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warrant before entering a private residence.! Warrantless searches or
seizures in a home are presumed to be unconstitutional." The
warrant requirement is the primary means of ensuring that law
enforcement officers comply with the protections guaranteed by the
Fourth Amendment.'
The first purpose of a warrant is to place a

inside." BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 236 (7th ed. 1999). Exigent circumstances include
hot pursuit, emergency entries, and search incident to an arrest. See 2JOHN WESLEY
HALL, JR., SEARCH AND SEIZURE, § 19:7, at 8 (2d ed. 1993) [hereinafter 2 HALL].
For an analysis of hot pursuit, see Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S.
294 (1967). The Supreme Court in Hayden upheld an entry into a home without a
warrant because the police arrived at the suspect's home just minutes after an armed
robbery, and the police had been informed that the suspect was in the home. See id
at 298-99. The Court stated that "'the exigencies of the situation made that course
imperative.'" Id at 298 (quoting McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456
(1948)).
For an analysis of an emergency situation, see Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385
(1978). In Mincey, the Court stated that "'[t]he need to protect or preserve life or
avoid serious injury is justification for what would be otherwise illegal absent an
exigency or emergency.'" Id at 392-93 (quoting Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d
205, 212 (D.C. Cir. 1963)).
In Agnelo v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 30 (1925), the Court approved of a search
incident to arrest, declaring that "[t]he right without a search warrant
contemporaneously to search persons lawfully arrested while committing crime and
to search the place where the arrest is made ... is not to be doubted."
9 See Payton, 445 U.S. at 589; see also Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 357
(1967) (explaining that "searches conducted outside the judicial process, without
prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment-subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated
exceptions"); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528-29 (1967) (contending
that "one governing principle, justified by history and by current experience, has
consistently been followed: except in certain carefully defined classes of cases, a
search of private property without proper consent is 'unreasonable' unless it has
been authorized by a valid search warrant"); Jeffers, 342 U.S. at 51 (averring that "[the
Supreme] Court has emphasized that the mandate of the [Fourth] Amendment
requires
adherence to judicial process").
10
See See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 543 (1967) (noting that
a search of a
home, if conducted without a warrant, is presumptively unreasonable); see also
United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714-15 (1984), stating that
[a] t the risk of belaboring the obvious, private residences are places in
which the individual normally expects privacy free of governmental
intrusion not authorized by a warrant, and that expectation is plainly
one that society is prepared to recognize asjustifiable. Our cases have
not deviated from this basic Fourth Amendment principle. Searches
and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively
unreasonable absent exigent circumstances.
Id
See Protecting Privacy, supra note 3, at 315. To ensure that the Fourth
Amendment's protection of personal privacy is respected, the Supreme Court has a
strict warrant requirement. See id. The warrant requirement serves as a judicial
check on executive discretion, which is a function of separation of powers. See id. at
319. The scope of a warrant is also limited by the particularity clause of the Fourth
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neutral judicial officer between the subject of a search or seizure and
the government official executing the search or seizure, thus
eliminating searches that are not based on probable cause.12
Intrusions by the government are considered to be an evil and,
therefore, must be carefully limited and regulated to prevent abuse.' s
The second purpose of a warrant is to limit an officer's
discretion during the execution of a search or seizure." A warrant
circumscribes and defines the scope of the intrusion, thereby limiting
an officer's discretion and preventing general searches that are
prohibited by the Fourth Amendment.'5
The Warrant Clause
Amendment. See id. at 320. The particularity clause of the Fourth Amendment
requires that a warrant shall "particularly describ[e] the place to be searched, and
the persons to be seized." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
SeeJohnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948). The Court explained that
to permit a search without ajudicially approved warrant would nullify the protections
guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment. See id. at 17. The Court reasoned that the
protection that a warrant provides emanates from a review of the evidence and
inferences by a neutral and detached judicial officer, rather than from a review of
the evidence by an executive officer "engaged in the often competitive enterprise of
ferreting out crime." Id. at 14. The Court declared that if personal privacy is to be
invaded, "the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial officer, not by a
policeman or Government enforcement agent." Id.; see also United States v.
Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 9 (1977) (stating that "[t] he judicial warrant has a significant
role to play in that it provides the detached scrutiny of a neutral magistrate, which is
a more reliable safeguard against improper searches than the hurried judgment of a
law enforcement officer"); Jeffers, 372 U.S. at 51 (propounding that "the [Fourth]
Amendment does not place an unduly oppressive weight on law enforcement officers
but merely interposes an orderly procedure under the aegis of judicial impartiality
that is necessary to attain the beneficent purposes intended").
Because United States citizens have a right of security against arbitrary
government intrusions, the warrant requirement attempts to eliminate those
searches that are not necessary or justified by the evidence. See Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467 (1971). The Coolidge Court contended that the
colonists won by revolution "a right of personal security against arbitrary intrusions
by official power." Id. at 455. The purpose of a magistrate in this process is to
eliminate all searches not based on probable cause. See id. at 467.
13 See Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 467 (stating that "any intrusion
in the way of search and
seizure is an evil"); Sgro v. United States, 287 U.S. 206, 210 (1932) (explaining that
"[t]he proceeding by a search warrant is... drastic" and that the search and seizure
process of the Fourth Amendment "should be liberally construed in favor of the
individual").
14 See Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 467 (asserting that the second
objective of the warrant
requirement "is that those searches deemed necessary should be as limited as
possible"); see also Christopher D. Comeau, Investigation and Police Practices: The
Warrant Requirement 86 GEO. LJ. 1198, 1211-12 (1998) (noting that law enforcement
officers may not exceed the terms of a warrant when conducting a search or seizure).
15 See Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 467. The Supreme Court has
suggested that it is not
the intrusive nature of a government search per se, but the general, exploratory
nature of the search of a person's home and belongings that angered the colonists
and that the Fourth Amendment is designed to prohibit. See id.; see also supra note 4
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requirement that the places to be searched and things to be seized be
particularly described prevents an officer from having unfettered
discretion.' 6 The existence of a warrant helps to ensure that the
rights of those against whom the warrant is directed are protected
because if the scope of the search is not carefully delineated, the
privacy of an individual and the sanctity of his home are more likely
to be violated. 7
Although a warrant protects the privacy of an individual from
unjustified governmental intrusion, a warrant does not necessarily
protect the privacy of an individual from invasion by the press. Press
invasion of privacy has been a significant issue in American
jurisprudence since Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis first
articulated an individual's right to privacy from the media over one
hundred years ago.' A recent development affecting the privacy and
and accompanying text (discussing general warrants). The Fourth Amendment
prohibits searches that, although reasonable at their inception, become
unreasonable because of their impermissible scope or intensity. See Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968); see also Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)
(propounding "that the 'reasonableness' of a particular seizure depends not only on
when it is made, but also on how it is carried out") (citations omitted).
16 See Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927)
(declaring that "[t]he
requirement that warrants shall particularly describe the things to be seized makes
general searches under them impossible and prevents the seizure of one thing under
a warrant describing another. As to what is to be taken, nothing is left to the
discretion of the officer executing the warrant"). In Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 467, the
Court opined that
[t]he second, distinct objective is that those searches deemed necessary
should be as limited as possible. Here, the specific evil is the 'general
warrant' abhorred by the colonists, and the problem is not that of
intrusion per se, but of a general, exploratory rummaging in a person's
belongings.
The warrant accomplishes this second objective by
requiring a 'particular description' of the things to be seized.
Id. (citations omitted).
17 See Chadwick 433 U.S. at 9. The Court in Chadwick declared
that the execution
of a search pursuant to prior judicial approval is likely not to exceed the bounds set
by the warrant. See id. The Court maintained that a warrant assures the subject of a
search or seizure of "the lawful authority of the executing officer, his need to search,
and the limits of his power to search." 1I (citing Camara v. Municipal Court, 387
U.S. 523, 532 (1967)); see also Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967). The Supreme
Court in Bergerstated that a search warrant must be carefully circumscribed so as to
prevent unauthorized invasions of one's privacy and to protect the sanctity of the
home. See id. at 58 (citing Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)); see also
Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 482 n.ll (1976) (explaining that, with regard to
searches and seizures, "responsible officials, including judicial officials, must take
care to assure that they are conducted in a manner that minimizes unwarranted
intrusions upon privacy").
is See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 5, at 195. Warren and Brandeis argued that
the law should recognize a general right of privacy from media intrusion. See id.
Contending that the newspapers of their day were committing an evil by invading
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sanctity of the home has been the rise of media "ride-alongs," in
which members of the media accompany police officers during the
execution of warrants.'
The practice of allowing members of the
media to observe the execution of warrants in homes raises
significant constitutional questions with regard to the privacy and
sanctity of a dwelling."
The United States Supreme Court recently analyzed the
constitutional implications of media "ride-alongs" during the
execution of a warrant in Wilson v. Layne.2 ' The Court held that the
presence of the media during the execution of a warrant in a home
privacy, Warren and Brandeis stated that "[i]nstantaneous photographs and
newspaper enterprise have invaded the sacred precincts of private and domestic life;
and numerous mechanical devices threaten to make good the prediction that 'what
is whispered in the closet shall be proclaimed from the house-tops.'" Id. Because, in
their view, the press was overstepping the bounds of propriety, Warren and Brandeis
argued for a right of privacy that provided individuals with a necessary retreat from
the intensity and complexities of life. See id at 196. For Warren and Brandeis, the
home was an area of privacy that was protected from the press as well as the state. See
id at 220. At least one other commentator has also supported the notion that a
home should be a sanctuary from the world. See Michael N. Levy, Comment, The
Price of Fame: Should Law Enforcement Officers WIo Permit Camera Crews to Film the
Execution of a Warrant in a PrivateHome Be Held Liable for Civil Damages?, 92 Nw. U. L.
REV. 1153, 1154 (1998) (arguing that "a sane, decent, civilized society must provide
some such oasis, some shelter from public scrutiny, some insulated enclosure, some
enclave, some inviolate place which is a man's castle").
19 See David E. Bond, Note, Police Liability for the Media "Ride-Along," 77 B.U.
L.
REv. 825, 825-26 (1997) (stating that, in recent years, media "ride-alongs" have
become a popular television format with high ratings); see also Ransom, supra note 4,
at 325 (noting the "voracious appetite" that the public has for reality-based
entertainment, especially shows focusing on law enforcement); Antonio Yanez, Jr.,
Ayeni v. Mottola and the Implications of CharacterizingVideotaping as a Fourth Amendment
Seizure, 61 BROOK L. REv. 507, 507 (1995) (observing that real-life television shows, in
which camera crews follow and observe the activities of the police, fire department,
and emergency medical technicians, have become increasingly popular in the
nineties).
20 See Bond, supra note 19, at 826-27 (arguing
that serious constitutional
questions are raised when the "police open otherwise closed doors to the camera"
and that "the police sometimes oblige the media at the expense of individual
rights"); see also Ransom, supra note 4, at 355 (supporting the notion that, in the
context of the media accompanying law enforcement officers during the execution
of a search warrant, the privacy rights of an individual do not disappear once he
becomes the subject of a warrant). But see Levy, supra note 18, at 1190-91 (conceding
that the media's right of access to cover police activities is limited, but arguing that
the media have an important role to play in covering the criminal justice system).
Levy asserts that allowing coverage from arrest to trial provides the public with
greater knowledge about the criminal justice process and may encourage greater
public involvement in the process. See i. at 1191; see also Klindera, supra note 3, at
431 n.40 (arguing that practice of media "ride-alongs" is in accord with the Supreme
Court's approach to the First Amendment and the press).
2 119 S. CL 1692 (1999).
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violates the Fourth Amendment.n Because the law was not clearly
established at the time of the constitutional violation, however, the
Court held that the officers who allowed the media to accompany
them were entitled to qualified immunity."
On April 14, 1992, as a part of "Operation Gunsmoke,"N a team
of federal and state law enforcement officers was formed to execute
an arrest warrant for Dominic Wilson. 5 On April 16, 1992, a reporter
and photographer from the Washington Post accompanied the team in
order to observe and record its law enforcement activities, including
the arrest of Dominic Wilson." The arrest warrant for Dominic
Wilson did not mention any media presence or third-party
assistance."
See id.at 1699.

The Court found that "it is a violation of the Fourth
Amendment for police to bring members of the media or other third parties into a
home during the execution of a warrant when the presence of the third parties in
the home was not in aid of the execution of the warrant." Id
See id.at 1700. The Court found "that it was not unreasonable for a police
officer in April 1992 to have believed that bringing media observers along during the
execution of an arrest warrant (even in a home) was lawful." Id. Qualified immunity
is defined as an "[iimmunity from civil liability for a public official who is performing
a discretionary function, as long as the conduct does not violate clearly established
constitutional or statutory rights." BLAcK's LAw DIcrIONARY 753 (7th ed. 1999).
24 "Operation Gunsmoke" is a special apprehension program
designed to capture
dangerous fugitives. See Brief for Respondents, Deputy Sheriffs at 1, Wilson v. Layne,
119 S. Ct. 1692 (1999) (No. 98-83).
25 See Wilson v. Layne, 141 F.3d 111, 113 (4th Cir. 1998).
Dominic Wilson was
targeted for outstanding charges of theft, robbery, and assault. See Brief for
Respondents, Deputy Sheriffs at 2, Wilson (No. 98-83). The law enforcement team
included Joseph L Perkins and James A. Olivo, both of the United States Marshals
Service, as well as Mark A. Collins, Brian E. Roynestad, and Eric E. Runion of the
Montgomery County, Maryland Sheriff's Department. See Wilson, 141 F.3d at 113.
See Wilson, 119 S. Ct. at 1695-96. The two reporters were from the Washington
Post, and they had been permitted to accompany the team for a two-week period to
observe the execution of various warrants. See Brief for Respondents, U.S. Marshals
at 2, Wilson (No. 98-83). Deputy United States Marshal Layne decided to allow the
reporter and photographer to accompany the team on Operation Gunsmoke. See
Brief for Respondents, Deputy Sheriffs at 3, Wilson (No. 98-83). This decision was
made pursuant to a United States Department of Justice, United States Marshals
Service policy, which acknowledged that media ride-alongs are an effective means of
promoting an accurate portrayal of law enforcement officers at work. See i&
See Wilson, 119 S. Ct. at 1695. The warrant permitted only "'any duly
authorized peace officer' to arrest Dominic Jerome Wilson." Brief for Petitioners at
3, Wilson (No. 98-83). The reporters merely observed the law enforcement personnel
and were not involved in the execution of the arrest warrant. See Brief for
Respondents, U.S. Marshals at 4, Wilson (No. 98-83). The participating U.S. Marshals
understood that the press was to ride along during the execution of the warrant and
to stay out of the officers' way. See Brief for Respondents, Deputy Sheriffs at 4, Wilson
(No. 98-83). Prior to the search, there was no discussion about whether the media
members would be permitted to enter a private residence. See id.
2
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The team and the reporters proceeded to the address listed in
Dominic Wilson's police and probation records," but the address was
actually the home of Dominic Wilson's parents, Charles and
Geraldine Wilson." At 6:45 a.m. on April 16, 1992, the officers,
accompanied by the reporters, entered the home of Charles and
Geraldine Wilson to arrest Dominic Wilson.38 Upon encountering
the officers in his living room, Charles Wilson was subdued by the
officers, who believed that he was Dominic Wilson."'
After a
protective sweep, the officers determined that Dominic Wilson was
not in the home and departed 2 The two reporters observed the
entire search and took several photographs.ss
Subsequently, the Wilsons brought a Bivens action3 ' and a § 1983
claim under Title 42 of the United States Code 5 against the officers
in their personal capacities. 8 The Wilsons contended in their
complaint that the officers violated their Fourth Amendment rights
by allowing members of the media to accompany the officers into
their home.
The officers moved for summary judgments' on the
2

See Wson, 141 F.3d at 113.

Dominic Wilson often listed 909 North Stone

Street, Rockville, Maryland, his parents' address, as his home address. See Brief for
Resgondents, Deputy Sheriffs at 2, Wilson (No. 98-83).
See Wson, 119 S. Ct. at 1696.
30 See id.
31 See id. Charles Wilson, wearing only a pair of briefs, was forced to the floor
and
restrained. See id.
32 See id.
" See id. The reporters looked around the house, took several photographs, and
viewed the confrontation between the officers and Charles Wilson. See id. The
Washington Post never printed the photos of the incident. See id.
A Bivens action is derived from Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Defendants, 403
U.S. 388 (1971) and is defined as "[a] lawsuit brought to redress a federal official's
violation of a constitutional right." BLACK'S LAW DiCrIONARY 162 (7th ed. 1999). The
Bivens action was brought against the U.S. Marshals for their alleged violation of the
Wilsons' Fourth Amendment rights. See Wilson, 119 S. Ct. at 1696.
Title 42, § 1983 of the United States Code provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress ....
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
This statute was the basis for the action brought against the Montgomery County
Sheriff's Department. See Wilson, 119 S. Ct. at 1696.
36 See Wilson, 119 S. Ct. at 1696.
37 See id. The Wilsons also alleged that the officers did
not have probable cause
to enter their home and used excessive force, but these charges were dismissed. See
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basis of qualified immunity, but the district court denied their
motion. 9
The officers made an interlocutory appeal to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, which, in a divided panel,
reversed the district court and granted the officers qualified
immunity. 0 Judge Wilkins, writing for the majority, did not decide
the constitutionality of the search under the Fourth Amendment, but
focused solely on the issue of qualified immunity." Accordingly, the
court examined the state of the law at the time of the events in
question to determine if the right claimed by the Wilsons was clearly
established.2 The majority found that because the right in question
was not clearly established in April 1992, the officers were entitled to
qualified immunity. 0 In dissent, Judge Russell argued that the
officers' actions were clearly unreasonable and violated the Fourth
Amendment; the officers, therefore, were not entitled to a qualified
immunity defense.44
The case was reheard en banc before the Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit.0 A divided panel, considering only the issue of
Brief for Petitioners at 6, Wilson (No. 98-83).
"Summary judgment" is defined as "[a] judgment granted on a claim about
which there is no genuine issue of material fact and upon which the movant is
entitled to prevail as a matter of law." BLAcK's LAw DICroNARY 1449 (7th ed. 1999).
39 See Wlson, 119
S. CL at 1696.
40 See

id.

SeeWilson v. Layne, 110 F.3d 1071, 1073 (4th Cir. 1997). Because the facts
of
the case were not in dispute, the court considered only the purely legal inquiry of
whether the state of the law was clearly established at the time the warrant was
executed. See ii at 1073 n.3.
See Wilson, 110 F.3d at 1074-76. Judge Wilkins stressed that the court was "not
called upon to determine whether the officers' conduct was constitutional or
appropriate, only whether the legal landscape when these events occurred was
sufficiently developed that it would have been obvious to reasonable officers that the
actions at issue were violative of the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 1075-76.
See id. at 1076. Judge Wilkins declared that "[b]ecause in April 1992 it was not
clearly established that permitting media representatives to accompany law
enforcement officers into a private residence to observe and photograph their
attempt to execute a warrant would violate the homeowner's constitutional rights, we
hold that these officers are entitled to qualified immunity." Id.
See id. (Russell, J., dissenting). Judge Russell argued that "[i]t is not reasonable
for officers to invite reporters into a private home while they execute an arrest
warrant." Id. Judge Russell agreed with the Second Circuit "that Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence long ago clearly established that police may not invite reporters into
private homes when they are executing warrants if those reporters are neither
,expressly nor impliedly authorized to be there.'" Id. at 1077 (Russell, J., dissenting)
(quoting Ayeni v. Mottola, 35 F.3d 680, 686 (2d Cir. 1994)).
See Wilson, 119 S. Ct. at 1696. The case was actually reheard twice en banc due
to Judge Russell's death, which occurred shortly after the first rehearing. See Brief
41
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qualified immunity, held that the right was not clearly established at
the time of the entry into the Wilsons' home.4 Judge Wilkins, writing
for a majority of six judges, observed that the officers had no clearly
established law to follow from the Fourth Circuit, United States
Supreme Court, or Maryland Court of Appeals.4 ' The court found
that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity because it was
not obvious to a reasonable officer at the time of the search that such
actions violated the Fourth Amendment." Judge Murnaghan, in a
dissent joined by four judges, maintained that the officers' actions
violated clearly established Fourth Amendment law.49
Recognizing a split among the circuits, the Supreme Court
granted certioraris to determine if the practice of media "ride-

for Petitioners at 7, Wison (No. 98-83).
46 See Wlson, 141 F.3d at 118-19. The court stated
that "[b]ecause in April 1992 it
was not clearly established that permitting media representatives to accompany law
enforcement officers into a private residence to observe and photograph their
attempt to execute an arrest warrant would violate the homeowner's constitutional
rights, we hold that these officers are entitled to qualified immunity." I. Judge
Wilkins also maintained that "[t]he officers did not exceed the scope of the warrant
by permitting the reporters who accompanied them into the Wilsons' home to
engage in activities that the officers could not themselves have undertaken consistent
with the warrant." Id. at 115.
47 See id.
Judge Wilkins stated that "reasonable officers under these
circumstances had no clearly established law . . . from which they necessarily
understood that they exceeded the scope of an arrest warrant by permitting
reporters to engage in activities in which they themselves could have engaged
consistent
with the warrant." Id.
48See

i&.
at 118-19.

See Wilson, 141 F.3d at 120 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting). The dissent observed
that "[i]t has long been established that a police officer executing a warrant is
limited to those actions 'strictly within the bounds set by the warrant,' or reasonably
necessary for its execution." Id. at 119 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting) (citations
omitted). Continuing, the dissent argued that "[t]he police officers violated these
clearly established Fourth Amendment principles when they invited newspaper
reporters to enter a private home and photograph the residents for purely
commercial newspaper purposes during the execution of an arrest warrant." Id.
Judge Murnaghan propounded that
[b]ecause no reasonable police officer could have believed that
inviting the reporters into the home or allowing the photographer to
take pictures either was authorized by the warrant or was reasonably
necessary to accomplish its legitimate law enforcement purposes, the
police officers' actions amounted to unreasonable searches and
seizures in violation of clearly established Fourth Amendment law.
Id. at 120 (Murnaghan,J., dissenting).
50 119 S. Ct. 443 (1999).
The Supreme Court also granted certiorari to a
companion case, Hanlon v. Berger, 119 S. Ct. 443 (1999). See Wi/son, 119 S. Ct. at
1696. In contrast to the Fourth Circuit in Wilson, the Second Circuit held that media
"ride-alongs" violated the Fourth Amendment. SeeAyeni v. Mottola, 35 F.3d 680, 691
(2d Cir. 1994).

932

SETON HALL LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 30:922

alongs" violated the Fourth Amendment and, if so, whether the rights
protected were clearly established at the time of the violation." In an
opinion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Supreme Court
unanimously held that the presence of media members in a home
during the execution of a warrant violates the protections guaranteed
by the Fourth Amendment." The Court, however, split eight-to-one
regarding the qualified immunity issue." With respect to qualified
immunity, the majority concluded that the officers were entitled to a
qualified immunity defense because the right was not clearly
established at the time of the violation.5
Boyd v. United States,55 still a cornerstone of Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence, was the Supreme Court's first significant Fourth
Amendment case.5
Boyd involved a federal government action
against an importer for nonpayment of customs duties.
The
Supreme Court ruled that the government violated the defendant's

51 See Wilson, 119 S.Ct. at 1696.
52 See id.at 1699.
5 See id.
at 1701. Justice Stevens, concurring in the Court's Fourth Amendment
analysis, dissented on the issue of qualified immunity. See id.(Stevens, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part); see also supra notes 140-45 (detailingJustice Stevens's
opinion).
5 See id.
at 1700.
55 116U.S.616 (1886).
56 See Ransom, supra note 4, at 333 (describing Boyd as a landmark Fourth
Amendment decision); Bond, supra note 19, at 872 n.61 (noting that "Boyd was the
Court's first systematic discussion of the Fourth Amendment"); Note, Formalism, Legal
Realism, and ConstitutionallyProtected Privacy Under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, 90
HARv. L. RE.. 945, 945 (1977) ("Although some of the specific pronouncements of
the Boyd decision have been overruled in the ninety-one years since that decision was
first handed down, the case remains a cornerstone of [F]ourth and [F]ifth
[A] mendmentjurisprudence.").
57 See Boyd, 116 U.S. at 617-18. The federal government sought
the forfeiture of
35 cases of plate glass because of an alleged nonpayment of customs duties. See id.
The federal government introduced as evidence a copy of an invoice that the
defendants were forced to produce pursuant to an 1874 statute. See id.at 618. The
statute at issue required:
In all suits and proceedings other than criminal, arising under any of
the revenue laws of the United States, the attorney representing the
government, whenever in his belief any business book, invoice, or
paper belonging to, or under the control of, the defendant or
claimant, will tend to prove any allegation made by the United States,
may make a written motion, particularly describing such book, invoice,
or paper, and setting forth the allegation which he expects to prove;
and thereupon the court in which suit or proceeding is pending may,
at its discretion issue a notice to the defendant or claimant to produce
such book, invoice, or paper in court ....
Id. at 619-20.
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Fourth Amendment rights by conducting an unreasonable seizure.'"
In considering the reasonableness of the governmental action, the
Court relied upon the English case Entick v. Carrington as the basis
for discussion. 60 Boyd established that the Fourth Amendment applies
to invasions by the government into an individual's privacy of life and
sanctity of home.6 ' As a result, the Court concluded that the Fourth
Amendment was violated when the government compelled discovery
of an individual's private books, papers, or property.6'
The Supreme Court next applied Boyd's emphasis on the sanctity
of the home in Agnello v. United States.6 Agnello involved a warrantless
search of a defendant's home that was conducted after the defendant

5

Id.

See id. at 638. The Supreme Court declared:
We think that the notice to produce the invoice in this case, the order
by virtue of which it was issued, and the law which authorized the
order, were unconstitutional and void, and that the inspection by the
district attorney of said invoice, when produced in obedience by the
court, were erroneous and unconstitutional proceedings.

95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B. 1765). Entick involved a suit brought by a homeowner
whose residence was the subject of a general search. See id. at 807. The defendants
acted under the authority of a warrant issued by an agent of the King. See id. at 808.
The warrant authorized a general search of the plaintiff's home for any seditious
papers. See id. The court stated that "our law holds the property of every man so
sacred, that no man can set his foot upon his neighbour's close without his leave."
Id. at 817. Continuing, the court ruled the warrant void and illegal, stressing that
[the court] can safely say there is no law in this country to justify the defendants in
what they have done; if there was, it would destroy all the comforts of society." Id.
Entick has been hailed as a landmark in search and seizure law, with its tenets written
into the Fourth Amendment. See 1 HALL, supra note 2, § 1:4, at 11; see also Stanford v.
State of Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 484 (1965) (stating that the Court considered Entick to
be "a wellspring of the rights now protected by the Fourth Amendment").
60 See Boyd, 116 U.S. at 626. The Court stated that "every American
statesman,
during our revolutionary and formative period as a nation, was undoubtedly familiar
with this monument of English freedom, and considered it as the true and ultimate
expression of constitutional law." Id.
6, See id. at 630. Boyd noted that each person had an
"indefeasible right" to
personal security, liberty, and private property. See id Several commentators have
discussed Boyd's respect for privacy and the sacredness of the home. See Ransom,
supra note 4, at 333 (stating that Boyd represented the judiciary's reverence for the
sanctity of the home); Bond, supra note 19, at 834 (claiming that Boyd found that the
Fourth Amendment does not apply solely to the right of property, but also protects
privacy interests, including the sanctity of the home).
62 See Boyd, 116 U.S. at 631-32.
The Court propounded that such an act is
.contrary to the principles of a free government. It is abhorrent to the instincts of an
Englishman; it is abhorrent to the instincts of an American. It may suit the purposes
of despotic power, but it cannot abide the pure atmosphere of political liberty and
personal freedom." Id. at 632.
6s 269 U.S. 20, 32
(1925).
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was arrested a short distance from his residence." The Court stated
that a warrant is required to search a home and that the search in
Agnello, though supported by probable cause, violated the Fourth
Amendment. 5 The Court unanimously held that a search incident to
an arrest can be undertaken at the place of the arrest, but cannot be
extended to other locations without a warrant." Agnello confirmed
the vital role of the warrant in protecting the privacy interest
inherent in an individual's home.67
The Supreme Court continued to rely upon the principles
expounded in Boyd in Silverman v. United States." In Silverman,
government agents, acting without a warrant, inserted a microphone
into the wall of a house to eavesdrop on the suspects inside.6 The
See id at 29. Frank Agnello resided at 167 Columbia Street, Brooklyn,
New
York. See id. at 28. Agnello was arrested at 172 Columbia Street for possessing
narcotics. See id. at 29. After his arrest, government agents proceeded to Agnello's
home and conducted a search incident to his arrest. See id The agents discovered
additional narcotics, which were later entered against Agnello at trial. See id.
See id. at 33. The Court stated that "it has always been assumed
that one's
house cannot lawfully be searched without a search warrant, except as an incident to
a lawful arrest therein" and that a "search of a private dwelling without a warrant is in
itself unreasonable and abhorrent to our laws." Id. at 32. Regarding probable cause,
the Court said that a "[b]elief, however well founded, that an article sought is
concealed in a dwelling house, furnishes no justification for a search of that place
without a warrant. And such searches are held unlawful notwithstanding facts
unquestionably showing probable cause." Id. at 33.
See id. at 30. The Court upheld the practice of a search incident to an arrest,
noting that the "right without a search warrant contemporaneously to search persons
lawfully arrested.., is not to be doubted." Id. The Court found, however, that "the
right does not extend to other places" and that the search of Agnello's house
"cannot be sustained as an incident of the arrests." Id. at 30-31.
67 See David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme
Court: 1921-1930, 1986 DuKE
L.J. 65, 102-03 (noting that Agnello confirmed the assumption that a search of a home
without a warrant is unreasonable and that to allow a search without a warrant would
leave the Fourth Amendment a hollow shell); see alsoJames A. Adams, Search and
Seizure as Seen by Supreme Court Justices: Are They Serious or Is This JustJudicialHumor,
12 ST. Louis U. PUB. L REv. 413, 475 n.211 (1993) (arguing that Agnello stands for
the concept that the Warrant Clause provides privacy protection as it relates to a
search of a dwelling).
68 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961).
See id. at 506-07. The District of Columbia police, suspecting that
the home in
question was being used as a headquarters for gambling, established an observation
post in the home next door. See id, at 506. The officers inserted a "spike mike"
several inches into the wall of the home suspected of containing the gambling
operation, allowing them to hear conversations from throughout the house. See id at
506-07. The Court distinguished Silverman from Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S.
129 (1942). See id at 510, 512 (discussing Goldman). In Goldman, the Supreme Court
upheld the use of a listening device that the police utilized to overhear a
conversation in an adjoining room. See Goldman, 316 U.S. at 131-33. The device was
placed against, but not into, the wall. See id at 131-32. While not reexamining
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Court, noting that the home is a specially protected area under the
Constitution, held that the agents violated the Fourth Amendment.70
Although conceding that the intrusion had been minimal, the Court
maintained that the principle of the sanctity of the home, as
protected by the Constitution, prohibited unauthorized entry into a
home.7'
The Supreme Court returned to the issue of a warrantless search
of a home in the landmark case of Chimel v. California.7 As in Agnello,
Chimel involved a search of a home incident to an arrest. 7 After the
defendant was arrested in his home, the police proceeded to search
the entire dwelling, seizing evidence that was later used against the
defendant at trial.74 In considering the constitutionality of the police
action, the Supreme Court stressed the origins of the Fourth
Amendment and the Framers' concerns regarding general warrants. 75
Goldman, the Silverman Court refused "to go beyond it, by even a fraction of an inch."
Silverman, 365 U.S. at 512. The Silverman Court distinguished Goldmanbecause of the
actual physical intrusion into a home present in Silverman. See id
70 See Silverman, 365 U.S. at 511. The Court explained that the actual
physical
invasion of the home by means of the insertion of a "spike mike," without the
occupant's knowledge or consent, was an unauthorized intrusion. See id. The Court
emphasized that the home is protected by the Constitution, declaring that "[t]he
Fourth Amendment, and the personal rights which it secures, have a long history. At
the very core stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be
free from unreasonable government intrusion." Id. The majority also observed that
the Supreme Court had never allowed a law enforcement officer to enter a home in
order to secretly observe and listen to the activities therein, without a warrant. See id.
at 512.
71 See id. The Supreme Court opined that
the
decision here does not turn upon the technicality of a trespass upon a
party wall [sic] as a matter of local law. It is based upon the reality of
an actual intrusion into a constitutionally protected area. What the
Court said long ago bears repeating now: "It may be that it is the
obnoxious thing in its mildest and least repulsive form; but illegitimate
and unconstitutional practices get their first footing in that way,
namely, by silent approaches and slight deviations from legal modes of
procedure."
Id. (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886)).
7 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
Chimel has been called a landmark decision with respect
to protection of the home. See Adam Kennedy Peck, The Securing of the Premises
Exction: A Searchfor the ProperBalance,38 VAND. L. REV. 1589, 1591 (1985).
See Chime4 395 U.S. at 753-54.
74 See id. Officers, armed with an arrest warrant on a burglary charge, entered
Ted Chimel's home, having received his wife's permission. See id. at 753. The
officers arrested Chimel when he arrived at his home, and then the officers
conducted a search that lasted approximately forty-five minutes to one hour, in
which evidence of the burglary was discovered. See id. at 754. Chimel objected to the
search, but the officers informed him that the search was conducted on the basis of a
lawful arrest. See id. at 753-54.
75 See id. at 761; see also supra note 4 and accompanying text (discussing general
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The Court, noting that the right of the police to search incident to an
arrest is a limited one, 6 found no justification for searching the
entire home." As a result, the Court held that the officers violated
the Fourth Amendment because they had no justification, in the
absence of a warrant, to search the entire home. 8
Payton v. New York is another significant Supreme Court case
concerning the principle of the sanctity of the home. 8 Payton
involved the police practice of entering a home, based only on
probable cause and without a warrant, to arrest a suspect.81 In Payton,
the officers were granted authority by a New York statute to enter a
warrants and the history of the Fourth Amendment).
76 See Chime4 359 U.S. at 759.
The Court stated that "'[a] search or seizure
without a warrant as an incident to a lawful arrest has always been considered to be a
strictly limited right. It grows out of the inherent necessities of the situation at the
time of the arrest.'" Id. (quoting Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 705, 708
(1948)); see also Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 35 (1970) (declining to hold that an
arrest of a suspect in the street is an exigent circumstance).
See Chime, 395 U.S. at 763. The Court declared that only the room in which
the suspect was arrested could be searched. See id. With regard to the scope of the
search, the Court relied upon Terry. See id. at 762. In Terry, the Court emphasized
that the scope of a search is strictly tied to the reasons that justified its initiation. See
Terry, 392 U.S. at 19. The Court noted that a search, though reasonable at its
inception, may violate the Fourth Amendment by its unreasonable intensity or scope.
See id. at 18.
78 See Chime4 395 U.S. at 768. The Court rejected
outright the argument that the
search was reasonable, stating that the argument was premised "on little more than a
subjective view regarding the acceptability of certain sorts of police conduct, and not
on consideration relevant to Fourth Amendment interests." Id. at 764-65; see also
Scott E. Sundby, A Return to Fourth Amendment Basics: Undoing the Mischief of Camara
and Terry, 72 MINN. L. REv. 383, 448 n.14 (1988) (stating that the "Chimel majority
strongly reaffirmed an exceptions approach to the [F]ourth [A] mendment, expressly
rejecting the rule of reasonableness approach"). It has been argued that Chimel
suggests that a homeowner's expectation of privacy does not terminate after the
initial entry. See Peck, supra note 72, at 1619 n.120.
79 445 U.S. 573
(1980).
80 See 2 HALL, supra note 8, § 19:1, at 3 (describing Payton as the first
important
treatment of the notion that the home receives enhanced protection); Mascolo,
supra note 6, at 333 (arguing that Payton "had a significant impact upon the right of
privacy in the home").
See Payton, 445 U.S. at 576. This case involved the consolidation of two cases,
those of Theodore Payton and Obie Riddick. See id, at 576-79. New York police
officers gathered enough evidence to establish probable cause to arrest Payton for
murder. See id. at 576. The officers forcibly entered Payton's apartment. See id.
Payton was not home, but the officers seized a shell casing that was in plain view,
which ultimately was used as evidence against Payton at trial. See id. at 576-77. With
regard to Obie Riddick, the police, armed with probable cause but without a warrant,
proceeded to Riddick's home to arrest him for armed robbery. See id. at 578. The
police entered the home after Riddick's three-year-old son opened the door. See id.
Riddick was arrested, and during the search of the area under his control, the
officers discovered narcotics. See id
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home without a warrant to arrest a suspect as long as the officers had
a reasonable belief that the suspect was present.2 Though this police
strategy was common among the states, the Court recognized that the
importance of the sanctity of the home required a review of the
practice.83 The Court emphasized that the home is a zone of privacy
clearly protected by the Fourth Amendment."
The Court also
recognized the need for a warrant in order to protect the home from
needless invasion.85 Because the Fourth Amendment protects the
home as an area of personal privacy, the Court held that any6 entry
into a home, absent exigent circumstances, requires a warrant.
Building upon Payton, the Supreme Court next confronted the
issue of a police entry into a third party's home to arrest a suspect in
Steagald v. United States.8 Federal law enforcement officers, armed
with an arrest warrant, entered a third party's home in which the
See id. at 579 n.9. A New York statute granted the officers the authority to enter
homes to make arrests without warrants and also provided that "[i]n order to effect
such an arrest, a police officer may enter premises in which he reasonably believes
such person to be present... if he were attempting to make such arrest pursuant to
a warrant of arrest." N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAw § 140.15(4) (McKinney 1971).
93 See id. at 598, 600. At the time the case was
tried, 24 other states permitted
officers to enter a home to make arrests without a warrant. See id. at 598. The Court,
however, stated that "[a] longstanding, widespread practice is not immune from
constitutional scrutiny." Id. at 600. Continuing, the Court explained that "neither
history nor this Nation's experience requires us to disregard the overriding respect
for the sanctity of the home that has been embedded in our traditions since the
ori ns of the Republic." Id at 601.
See id. at 589-90. The Court stated that "[i]n [no setting] is the zone of privacy
more clearly defined than when bounded by the unambiguous physical dimensions
of an individual's home-a zone that finds its roots in clear and specific
constitutional terms." Id. at 589. The Court also discussed the common-law sources
of the Fourth Amendment, highlighting in particular the abusive use of general
warrants that motivated the Fourth Amendment's protections. See id. at 583. The
Court also indicated that the English common law demonstrated reverence for the
privacy of the home, a concept that "could not have been lost on the Framers." Id. at
596. With respect to the differences between a police entry to search for property as
compared to a police entry to arrest, the Court argued that the two intrusions involve
differences of degree, not of kind. See id at 589. Both, according to the Court, share
the basic characteristic of the breach of an individual's home. See id.
See id. at 586. The Supreme Court stated that the Court "long adhered to the
view that the warrant procedure minimizes the danger of needless intrusions of that
sort." Id. The Court also maintained that the presence of a warrant protects an
individual and his home by interposing a neutral judicial officer between the
individual and a zealous officer. See id. at 602-03.
86 See id. at 590. The Court also held that an arrest warrant founded
on probable
cause includes the limited authority to enter a home where the suspect resides when
it is reasonably believed that the suspect is within the home. See id. at 603.
87 451 U.S. 204, 205 (1981).
Steagald has been described as a case that had a
notable impact on the protection of privacy in the home. See Mascolo, supra note 6,
at 333.
92
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officers had probable cause to believe that the suspect named in the
arrest warrant was located." As a result of the entry, the officers
discovered illegal drugs and later arrested another individual, Gary
Steagaldl Although the law enforcement agents had an arrest
warrant, the Court concluded that the search violated the Fourth
Amendment. ®
The Court reiterated that, absent exigent
circumstances, an entry into a home without a warrant to make an
arrest or to conduct a search is unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment.9 ' Although the government agents in this case had an
arrest warrant, the Court held that an arrest warrant for one suspect
is insufficient to protect the privacy interests of third parties.9
Accordingly, the Court explained that an arrest warrant for one party
does not give law enforcement officials the discretion to search the
home of another not named in the warrant. 5
See Steagald, 451 U.S. at 206. In Steagal4 Drug Enforcement Administration
agents and officers, armed with an arrest warrant for Ricky Lyons, believed that the
suscect was located in the home of Hoyt Gaultney. See id.
See id at 206-07. Upon arriving at the home of Hoyt Gaultney, the agents
encountered Gaultney and petitioner Gary Steagald standing outside the house. See
id at 206. After determining that neither man was Lyons, the agents entered and
searched the home. See id During the search of the home, the officers observed
what they believed to be cocaine. See id. The agents then conducted a second search
of the home, which revealed further evidence. See id at 206-07. The agents then
obtained a search warrant, and conducted a third search of the home, and ultimately
arrested Gary Steagald on federal drug charges. See id. at 207.
90 See id. at 216. The Supreme Court declared that
[a] contrary conclusion-that the police, acting alone and in the
absence of exigent circumstances, may decide when there is sufficient
justification for searching the home of a third party for the subject of
an arrest warrant-would create a significant potential for abuse....
We have instead concluded that in such cases the participation of a
detached magistrate in the probable-cause determination is an
essential element of a reasonable search or seizure, and we believe that
the same conclusion should apply here.
Id. at 215-16.
91 See id. at 211 (citing Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980)).
Again, the
Court maintained that the purpose of the warrant is to interpose a neutral judicial
officer between the executive officer and the individual in order to weigh the
strength of the evidence "against the individual's interests in protecting his own
liberty and the privacy of his home." Id. at 212.
See id. at 213. The Court argued that the effectiveness of a warrant in
safeguarding Fourth Amendment interests depends upon what the warrant
authorizes a law enforcement officer to do. See id The Court charged that because,
in this case, the warrant authorized only the seizure of Ricky Lyons, the warrant
process did not protect the privacy interests of Gary Steagald. See id Because the
government agents did not obtain a warrant to search the home, the Court
concluded that the only protection afforded the petitioner was the agents' own
determination of probable cause. See id.
9
See id at 220. The Court announced that to allow otherwise "would create a
88
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In Arizona v. Hicks," the Supreme Court curtailed the amount of
discretion retained by police during a search of a home.95 Hicks
involved an emergency police entry into an apartment after a shot
was fired through the floor into the apartment below.96 During the
police investigation, an officer examined stereo equipment that was
in plain view and, having ascertained that it was stolen, seized the
equipment.97 The Court found that the officer conducted an
significant potential for abuse." Id. at 215. Moreover, the Court feared that an
officer "[a]rmed solely with an arrest warrant for a single person.., could search all
the homes of that individual's friends and acquaintances." Id. The Court also
explained that an arrest warrant would essentially be converted into a writ of
assistance, propounding that
[a]n arrest warrant, to the extent that it is invoked as authority to enter
the homes of third parties, suffers from the same infirmity [as writs of
assistance]. Like a writ of assistance, it specifies only the object of a
search-in this case, Ricky Lyons-and leaves to the unfettered
discretion of the police the decision as to which particular homes
should be searched.
Id. at 220. The Court declared that "[w]e do not believe that the Framers of the
Fourth Amendment would have condoned such a result." Id. Asserting that the
burden imposed on law enforcement in obtaining a warrant is minimal, the Court
concluded that the important interest of an individual to be secure in his home
outweighed this slight burden. See id. at 222.
480 U.S. 321 (1987).
95 See id. at 328. Hicks has been described as a "relatively innocuous decision,"
but
it is one of the few decisions in recent years favoring the individual's privacy interests
over the interests of law enforcement. See David M. Seid, Note, The Aftermath of
Arizona v. Hicks: An Expectation of Privacy at Home, 17 Am. J. CRiM. L. 81, 81, 84
(1989). Seid also argues that Hicks requires law enforcement officials, regardless of
their "good faith," to give attention to an individual's privacy rights. See id. at 93.
96 See Hicks, 480 U.S. at 323. Police officers responded to a shooting
in which a
bullet that was fired through the floor of the respondent's apartment injured an
individual in the apartment below. See id. The police entered the respondent's
apartment and found three weapons, including a sawed-off rifle. See id.
97 See id. An officer observed two sets of expensive stereo
equipment that
appeared out of place in the poorly furnished apartment. See id. Suspicious, the
officer moved some of the stereo components and recorded their serial numbers. See
id. After immediately notifying his headquarters, the officer learned that some of the
components were stolen. See id. Later, it was also determined that the remaining
components were stolen, and after a warrant was obtained, these components were
seized. See id. at 323-24. The officers argued that their actions were justified by the
plain view doctrine, which the Court expounded in Coolidge v. New Hampshire. See id.
at 324 (referring to Coolidge, 403 U.S. 443, 465 (1971)). In Coolidge, the Court stated
that "[i]t is well established that under certain circumstances the police may seize
evidence in plain view without a warrant." Id. at 465. The Coolidge Court, however,
asserted that the "plain view" search must supplement the original justification for
the intrusion and that such an extension is justified only when the officers
immediately realize that the items before them are evidence. See id. at 466. The
Court concluded that "the 'plain view' doctrine may not be used to extend a general
exploratory search from one object to another until something incriminating at last
emerges." Id.
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additional search that was unrelated to the original objective of the
entry." As a result, the Court held that any search or seizure in a
dwelling, unrelated to the original justifications for the entry, must be
independently supported by probable cause.98 Hicks reinforced the
principle that a warrant is needed to search a home and limited the
scope of such a search to the justifications that originally authorized
it.100

Against this foundation of precedent, the Supreme Court, in
Wilson v. Layne,'0 ' upheld the sanctity of the home against a lawful
intrusion that exceeded the bounds of the warrant that justified it.'Y2
The Court held that the presence of any third parties during a
warrant's execution in a dwelling violates the Fourth Amendment
unless their presence is to aid in the execution of the warrant.103 Yet,
the Court also held that because the Fourth Amendment right
asserted was not clearly established at the time of the violation, the
officers were entitled to a grant of qualified immunity that shielded
them from civil liability.Y4
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, first analyzed the
special protection afforded the home by the Fourth Amendment.' 8
Tracing the roots of this principle to the English common law, the
opinion noted that English courts treated the home as the owner's

98 See Hicks, 480 U.S. at 324-25. The Court noted that the purpose of the
entry
was to find the shooter and the weapons used, not to search for stolen stereo
equipment. See id. The Court maintained that "taking action, unrelated to the
objectives of the authorized intrusion, which exposed to view concealed portions of
the apartment or its contents, did produce a new invasion of respondent's privacy
unjustified by the exigent circumstances that validated the entry." Id. at 325.
Though the invasion was slight, the Court maintained that "[a] search is a search,
even if it happens to disclose nothing but the bottom of a turntable." Id.
99 See id. at 326-27. The Supreme Court declared that "[a] dwelling-place search,
no less than a dwelling-place seizure, requires probable cause, and there is no reason
in theory or practicality why application of the 'plain view' doctrine would supplant
that requirement." Id. at 328.
100 See id. at 327. As to the additional search of the stereo equipment, the
Supreme Court determined that "[i]n short, whether legal authority to move the
equipment could be found only as an inevitable concomitant of the authority to seize
it, or also as a consequence of some independent power to search certain objects in
plain view, probable cause to believe the equipment was stolen was required." Id. at
328. The Court reiterated that the home is an area "where searches and seizures
without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable." d. at 327.
101 119 S. Ct. 1692 (1999).
'0
See id.at 1699.
Jos See id
104 See id at
1700-01.
105

See id at 1697.
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castle.'0 6 The Court observed that the Fourth Amendment embodied
this centuries-old principle that defended the privacy of the home.'"
Next, Chief Justice Rehnquist explained that Court precedent
extended this principle such that, absent exigent circumstances, a
warrant was required to enter a home.'l8
Noting that the officers in Wilson had a warrant, Chief Justice
Rehnquist discussed the parameters of the authority granted to a law
enforcement official when executing a valid warrant."
The Court
stated that a warrant based on probable cause grants an officer the
limited authority to enter a home when there is a reason to believe
the suspect is there."0 The Court maintained, however, that a
warrant does not necessarily entitle an officer to allow the media to
accompany the officers to observe the execution of the warrant."'
Chief Justice Rehnquist emphasized that the scope of the execution
of a warrant is strictly limited by the terms of the warrant" 2 The
Court declared that, while every action undertaken by police during a
106 See itt Chief Justice Rehnquist quoted the famous observation made
in 1604
that "the house of every one is to him as his castle and fortress, as well as for his
defence against injury and violence, as for his repose." Id. (quoting Semayne's Case,
77 Eng. Rep. 194, 195 (K.B. 1604)). The opinion also quoted William Blackstone,
who noted that "the law of England has so particular and tender a regard to the
immunity of a man's house, that it stiles it his castle, and will never suffer it to be
violated with impunity." I.

(quoting 4 WiLLiAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *223).

See Wlson, 119 S. Ct. at 1697.
108 See id. The Court noted that a physical invasion of the home is the primary
evil
against which the Fourth Amendment is directed. See id. Chief Justice Rehnquist
also analyzed Payton and observed that the "'overriding respect for the sanctity of the
home that has been embedded in our traditions since the origins of the Republic'"
meant that the police must obtain a warrant prior to entering a home, unless exigent
circumstances exist. Id. (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 603-04 (1980));
see also supra notes 79-86 and accompanying text (discussing Payton).
109 See id. at
1697.
110 See id. The Court noted that "[w]e decided that 'an arrest warrant founded
on
probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to enter a dwelling in
which the suspect lives, when there is a reason to believe the suspect is within.'" See
id. (quoting Payton, 445 U.S. at 603-04).
See id. ChiefJustice Rehnquist determined that "[h]ere, of course, the officers
had such a warrant, and they were undoubtedly entitled to enter the Wilson home in
order to execute the arrest warrant for Dominic Wilson. But it does not necessarily
follow that they were entitled to bring a newspaper reporter and a photographer with
them." I.
112 See id. at 1697-98. ChiefJustice Rehnquist noted that the Court
previously had
held that "'[i]f the scope of the search exceeds that permitted by the terms of a
validly issued warrant or the character of the relevant exception from the warrant
requirement, the subsequent seizure is unconstitutional without more.'" I. (quoting
Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 140 (1990)); see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19
(1968) (noting that "the scope of a search must 'be strictly tied to and justified' by
the circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible") (citations omitted).
107
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5
warrant does not have to be authorized by the text of the warrant,1
the actions of the police in executing a warrant must be related to the
purposes of the intrusion. 4 After noting that the law enforcement
officers admitted that the press observers did not aid in the execution
of the warrant, the Court declared that the presence of the reporters
was not related to the objectives of the intrusion." 5
The Court next addressed the respondents' contention that the
presence of the media, though not related to the objectives of the
intrusion, nonetheless served legitimate law enforcement purposes.116
The ChiefJustice noted that the officers claimed that they should be
permitted to exercise reasonable discretion to determine if the
media's presence at the execution of a warrant would serve a law
enforcement objective." 7 ChiefJustice Rehnquist rejected this claim,
noting that while the media's presence might further general law
enforcement objectives, it did not further the specific purposes of the
search." 8 The Court also maintained that the officers' contention

11 See Wilson, 119 S. CL at 1698. The Court announced that "this does not
mean
that every police action while inside a home must be explicitly authorized by the text
of the warrant." &d (citing Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705 (1981) (holding
that the Fourth Amendment permitted temporary detention of a homeowner while
the police executed a search warrant)).
* See Wilson, 119 S. Ct. at 1698 (citing Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987)); see
also supra notes 94-100 (analyzing Hicks); Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 87
(1987) ("[T] he purposesjustifying a police search strictly limit the permissible extent
of the search.").
n5 See Wilson, 119 S. Ct. at 1698. Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that "[c]ertainly
the presence of reporters inside the home was not related to the objectives of the
authorized intrusion" because "[t]he reporters .. . were not present for any reason
related to the justification for police entry into the home-the apprehension of
Dominic Wilson." Id.; see also Brief for Respondents, U.S. Marshals at 4, Wilson (No.
98-83) (stating that the presence of the reporters did not serve a law enforcement
purpose and that they did not assist in the execution of the warrant). Chief Justice
Rehnquist maintained that this was not a case of a third party directly aiding in the
execution of a warrant, a practice that the Court approved, consistent with commonlaw tradition. See Wilson, 119 S. Ct. at 1698.
116 See Wilson, 119 S. Ct. at 1698.
117 See id.; see also Brief for Respondents, U.S. Marshals at 15, Wilson (No. 98-83)

(stating that law enforcement officers should be able to exercise discretion as to
"when it would further their law enforcement mission to permit members of the
news media to accompany them in executing a warrant"); Brief of ABC, Inc., et al. as
Amikus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 3, Wilson (No. 98-83) (contending that
the Supreme Court should not adopt a per se rule forbidding the practice of media
"ride-alongs").
18 See Wilson, 119 S. Ct. at 1698. In Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978), the
Supreme Court articulated a similar concern regarding the efficiency of law
enforcement by propounding that "the privacy of a person's home and property may
not be totally sacrificed in the name of maximum simplicity in enforcement of the
criminal law." See id. at 393.
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ignored the importance of residential privacy, a right central to the
Fourth Amendment."9 ChiefJustice Rehnquist asserted that allowing
general law enforcement objectives to trump the protections of the
Fourth Amendment would significantly dilute the privacy protections
guaranteed by the Constitution."
The Court also refuted the officers' claim that the media's
presence during the execution of a warrant serves the legitimate law
enforcement purpose of publicizing the efforts of the police to
combat crime.12 1 Chief Justice Rehnquist agreed with the argument
that the media occupies an important position in the administration
of justice, a role recognized by the Court in the past.'22 After
balancing the interests of the press against the important right of

See Wdson, 119 S. Ct. at 1698. The Court declared that "this claim ignores the
importance of the right of residential privacy at the core of the Fourth Amendment."
Id
10 See id Chief Justice Rehnquist propounded that
"were such generalized 'law
enforcement objectives' themselves sufficient to trump the Fourth Amendment, the
protections guaranteed by that Amendment's text would be significantly watered
down." Id.
121 See id.; see also Brief of ABC, Inc., et al. as Amicus Curiae in
Support of
Respondents at 8, Wlson (No. 98-83). Amici highlighted the importance of the
media in providing the raw material, as well as in acting as a catalyst for public
discussion of governmental affairs. See id at 6. Amici argued that a per se rule
banning the practice of media "ride-alongs" would eliminate an important
journalistic tool that is the only means by which the public can monitor government
abuses first hand. See id at 7-8. They also alleged that "[a] per se rule affords no
weight at all to this important interest in striking the constitutional balance with the
incremental diminution of privacy that may result from the news media's presence at
a warrant's execution." Id at 3.
12 See Wdson, 119 S. CL at 1698. ChiefJustice Rehnquist noted
that "'in a society
in which each individual has but limited time and resources with which to observe at
first hand the operations of his government, he relies necessarily upon the press to
bring him in convenient form the facts of those operations.'" I.
(quoting Cox
Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491-92 (1975)). Cox involved an action under a
Georgia privacy statute by the father of a deceased, seventeen-year-old rape victim.
See Cox, 420 U.S. at 471-72. The defendant, a news organization, publicized the
victim's name after it had it learned her identity upon review of the trial court's
documents. See id. at 472-74. The Supreme Court, while noting the importance of
privacy, held that "the protection of freedom of the press provided by the First and
Fourteenth Amendments bars the State of Georgia from making appellants'
broadcast the basis of civil liability." Md.at 496-97. The Court explained that both
privacy and freedom of the press were plainly rooted in the traditions of society and
jurisprudence.
See id at 491.
The Court concluded that criminal judicial
proceedings "are without question events of legitimate concern to the public and
consequently fall within the responsibility of the press to report the operations of
government." Id at 492. The Court, however, also observed that "a physical or other
tangible intrusion into a private area" was not at issue, suggesting a different result if
that were the case. Id. at 489.
19
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residential privacy embodied by the Fourth Amendment,'" however,
the Court rejected the notion that the media's important role in
reporting the administration of criminal justice justified the media's
entry into a private home. 24 Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that
neither the positive public relations that might result for the police
nor the need for accurate reporting on law enforcement activities
provided a constitutional justification for granting the reporters
access to the home. ' 2s
Finally, the Court analyzed the officers' claim that the presence
of the media could serve to minimize abuses by police, protect the
suspect, and protect the officers themselves.'" While conceding that
it might be reasonable for law enforcement personnel themselves to
videotape entries into the home,'2 the Court reasoned that it was
unconstitutional for the reporters to do so because they were present
for their own private purposes; specifically, to work on a story for the
Washington Post, and not to protect either the police or the Wilsons.'"
The Court concluded that, while it might be constitutionally
permissible for third parties to be present during the execution of a
warrant under certain limited circumstances, the presence of these
reporters violated the Fourth Amendment.2'
123

124
1

See Wilson, 119 S. Ct. at 1698.
See idi
See id. ChiefJustice Rehnquist noted that
[s]urely the possibility of good public relations for the police is simply
not enough, standing alone, to justify the ride-along intrusion into a
private home. And even the need for accurate reporting on police
issues in general bears no direct relation to the constitutional
justification for the police intrusion into a home in order to execute a
felony arrest warrant.

See i& at 1699.
See id. The Court stated that
[w]hile it might be reasonable for police officers to themselves
videotape home entries as part of a "quality control" effort to ensure
that the rights of homeowners are being respected, or even to preserve
evidence .... such a situation is significantly different from the media
presence in this case.
Id. (citing Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 35 (1996)) (noting the use of a video
camera by police during a routine traffic stop)).
128 See id. Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that the photographs taken
during the
execution of the warrant were kept by the Washington Post, not the police, which
indicated that the photographer acted for private, not public, law enforcement
purposes. See id.
I See Wilson, 119 S. Ct. at 1699. The Court found that the presence of a third
party during the execution of a warrant is constitutional only if the third party
directly aids in the execution of the warrant. See id at 1698. ChiefJustice Rehnquist
declared that "[this is not a case in which the presence of the third parties directly
12

12
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After determining that the Wilsons' Fourth Amendment rights
were violated, the Court turned to the issue of qualified immunity."
To determine whether the officers were entitled to qualified
immunity, the Court had to decide if the constitutional right in
question was clearly established at the time of the violation."3 The
majority, utilizing the same analysis for both the state and federal
officers, determined that the officers did not violate a clearly
established right and, therefore, were entitled to qualified
immunity. 2
In determining that the officers did not violate a clearly
established right, Chief Justice Rehnquist first observed that at the
time of the violation, a reasonable officer would not have believed
that it was unlawful to allow the media to observe the execution of a
warrant, even in a private home.tss The majority noted that the
Fourth Amendment generally protects against searches without a
warrant, leaving only the question of whether the police exceeded
the bounds of a valid warrant in allowing the media members to
accompany them into the Wilsons' home. 3 Chief Justice Rehnquist
reasoned that the importance of accurate media coverage of law
enforcement activities made it inapparent to the officers that the
Fourth Amendment banned media "ride alongs. "1 3
Next, the Court announced that at the time of the warrant's
execution, no judicial opinions existed that expressly held that the
practice of media "ride-alongs" was unconstitutional."" Because the
aided in the execution of the warrant." Id.
ISOSee i. at 1699.
1 See id. Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that government officials are granted
qualified immunity when performing discretionary functions "'and are shielded from
liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.'"
I . (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).
3
See id. at 1700. Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that the qualified immunity
anasis is identical under § 1983 and Bivens. See id. at 1696.
See id at 1700. The majority stated that, to be clearly established, the right in
question must be established with an "appropriate level of specificity before a court
can determine if it was clearly established." Id. Chief Justice Rehnquist also
maintained that an officer's reasonableness is determined in light of existing clearly
established law and the information that the officers possessed at the time of the
violation. See id.
1
See id The Court reiterated that "[t]he Fourth Amendment protects the rights
of homeowners from entry without a warrant, but there was a warrant here." Id
1 See Wson, 119 S. Ct. at 1700 ("Accurate media coverage of police activities
serves an important public purpose, and it is not obvious from the general principles
of the Fourth Amendment that the conduct of the officers in this case violated the
Amendment.").
136 See id
Chief Justice Rehnquist also observed that at the time of the disputed

946

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:922

Wilsons failed to cite controlling or even persuasive authority
indicating that the right was clearly established at the time of the
violation, the majority declared that no reasonable officer would have
believed that his actions would be unlawful. 3 7 Moreover, the Court
bolstered the conclusion that the officers were entitled to qualified
immunity by noting that the officers relied upon a federal "ridealong" policy that endorsed the practice of allowing media members
to accompany officers into private homes during the execution of an
arrest warrant."
Finally, Chief Justice Rehnquist suggested that
because judges had disagreed on the issue of media "ride-alongs," it
would be unfair to subject the
police to damages for picking the
3 9
wrong side of the controversy.1
Justice Stevens, while concurring with the majority on the Fourth
Amendment question, dissented on the qualified immunity issue.'
Justice Stevens maintained that the right in question had been clearly
established by existing constitutional law prior to the acts in
question. 41 According to Justice Stevens, the Court's analysis merely
recognized a Fourth Amendment protection that was well established

actions, media "ride-alongs" were a common law enforcement practice. See it.
137 See id. The Court found that, prior to the events
in Wilson, the sole case that
even suggested that the officers' action might be unlawful was Bills v. Aseltine, 958
F.2d 697 (6th Cir. 1992). See id. The Wilson Court rejected the argument that Bills
clearly established that third-party entry into private homes was unlawful because
Bills was decided only a few weeks prior to the events in question and because of the
procedural posture of Bills. See id.
1s8 See i.
The Court also noted that the Montgomery County Sheriff's
Department did not explicitly prohibit media "ride-alongs." See id at 1700-01.
According to Chief Justice Rehnquist, because the state of the law as to third-party
entry during a warrant "was at best undeveloped," it was reasonable for the officers to
rel7 upon these formal policies. Id. at 1701.
See id. The Court declared that "[i]fjudges thus disagree on a constitutional
question, it is unfair to subject police to money damages for picking the losing side
of the controversy." Id.
140 See id. at 1701 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Justice
Stevens argued that
[l]ike every other federal appellate judge who has addressed the
question, I share the Court's opinion that it violates the Fourth
Amendment for police to bring members of the media or other third
parties into a private dwelling during the execution of a warrant unless
the homeowner has consented or the presence of the third parties is in
aid of the execution of the warrant.... I... disagree with the Court's
resolution of the conflict in the Circuits on the qualified immunity
issue.
Id.
141 See Wson, 119 S. Ct. at 1701 (StevensJ, concurring in part and dissenting in
part) ("In my view, however, the homeowner's right to protection against this type of
trespass was clearly established long before April 16, 1992.").
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prior to 1992.42 In Justice Stevens's view, the Court, in actuality,
refused to grant the respondent officers an exception to the wellestablished principle that police actions are confined to those acts
necessary to a warrant's execution.'4 Justice Stevens stressed that the
officers had no reasonable basis for challenging this principle.'" The
Justice concluded that because the officers' conduct contravened a
core protection of the Fourth Amendment, a grant of qualified
immunity was improper'
In Wilson, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the centuries-old
principle of the sanctity of the home. The Court adhered to clear
precedent that dictated that the Fourth Amendment provides the
home with special protection and stringently limits the discretion
available to law enforcement officers when executing a warrant.
Granting law enforcement officers the discretion to allow members of
the media access to a home would have significantly weakened the
protections guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment.
The practice of media "ride-alongs" essentially authorizes a
government-sponsored trespass into an individual's most private
domain.'4 A cardinal principle of the Fourth Amendment is that law
142

See id at 1702 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice

Stevens explained that "[i]n its decision today the Court has not announced a new
rule of constitutional law." I& TheJustice also maintained that the contours of the
right in question had been established before 1992 because the cases cited by the
Court in the Fourth Amendment discussion all had been decided prior to 1992. See
id
14s See id Justice Stevens argued that the principle of limiting
a warrant's
execution to the objectives of the intrusion had two important sources: the English
common law's respect for the home and the early American colonists' abhorrence of
general warrants. See id.
1
See id.at 1702-03 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Moreover, Justice Stevens argued that "[t] he Court fails to cite a single case that...
arguably supports the proposition that using official power to enable news
photographers and reporters to enter a private home for purposes unrelated to the
execution of a warrant could be regarded as a 'reasonable' invasion of either
property or privacy." Id at 1702 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
145 See id at 1704 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Justice
Stevens asserted that "[t]he conduct in this case, as the Court itself reminds us,
contravened the Fourth Amendment's core protection of the home. In shielding
this conduct as if it implicated only the unsettled margins of our jurisprudence, the
Court today authorizes one free violation of the well-established rule it reaffirms." Id.
at 1704.
14 See Brad M. Johnston, Note, The Media's PresenceDuring the
Execution of a Search
Warrant: A Per Se Vlation of the Fourth Amendment, 58 OHIo ST. LJ. 1499, 1534 n.126
(1997). Under the practice of media "ride-alongs," the authority granted to the
police pursuant to a search warrant is being utilized to permit the media otherwiseprohibited access to a home. See id at 1523-24. The purpose of the Fourth
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enforcement officers should not be permitted to determine the scope
of the execution of a warrant.
The history of the Fourth
Amendment's framing and the precedent of the Supreme Court
demonstrate that every intrusion into a home must either be
approved by a neutral judicial officer or justified by exigent
circumstances. All such intrusions must also be carefully and strictly
circumscribed to limit the intrusion and protect the privacy of the
home. The Wilson Court was correct in stressing that a search must
be strictly tied to the circumstances that rendered its initiation
possible.' 7
Governmental entry into a home is a necessary evil that must be
strictly limited in both intensity and scope. Allowing members of the
media into a home to observe a warrant's execution exceeds the
warrant's scope and unjustly intensifies the intrusion."8 The press
plays an important role in our country, particularly in monitoring
and publicizing government actions.'49 Citizens need to be informed
of the activities of the government, especially of the actions of law
enforcement. Unlike the courtroom or other public forums to which
the press normally has access, however, the home is closed to the
public.'O The Supreme Court has held in the past that the press can
be excluded from certain forums,' and the home is, and must
Amendment is to prevent government abuse of power, and using a warrant to allow
media members into a home is an abuse of that power. See i& at 1534, n.126; see also
Kent I. Middleton, Journalists, Trespass, and Officials: Closing the Door on Florida
Publishing Co. v. Fletcher, 16 PEP?. L. Rzv. 259, 266-67 (1989) (describing the
media's entry into a home during the execution of a warrant, without the
homeowner's consent, as an unconstitutional invasion).
147 See Wilson, 119 S. Ct. at 1697-98.
1
SeeJohnston, supra note 146, at 1527-29. Johnston contends that the presence
of the media exceeds a warrant's scope because it is unrelated to the warrant's
objectives and serves no legitimate law enforcement purpose. See id. Hence, the
media's presence causes a more intense invasion and violates the sanctity of the
home. See id. at 1529.
14 See supra note 122 and accompanying text (detailing the
role of the press in
publicizing government actions).
150 See Middleton, supra note 146, at 280 (arguing that "[h]istorically, a home,
in
contrast to a court, has not been open to the press and public for discussion of
public affairs").
1
SeeBranzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972). The Court stated that
[d]espite the fact that news gathering may be hampered, the press is
regularly excluded from grand jury proceedings, our own conferences,
the meetings of other official bodies gathered in executive session, and
the meetings of private organizations. Newsmen have no constitutional
right of access to the scenes of crime or disaster when the general
public is excluded, and they may be prohibited from attending or
publishing information about trials if such restrictions are necessary to
assure a defendant a fair trial before an impartial tribunal.
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continue to be, such a forum. A homeowner has the authority to
exclude intruders, even if these intruders are exercising a First
Amendment right.5 2 While the government can enter a home only if
either a warrant based on probable cause is obtained or if exigent
circumstances exist, the press can never enter a home unless consent
is obtained. Because the home is an area in which no First
Amendment right to press access can be asserted, the Court was
correct in denying media members the right to observe the execution
of warrants in the home.
Wilson's adoption of a bright-line rule prohibiting media "ridealongs" furthers a trend in the Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence in which clearer standards are adopted and balancing
tests are disfavored. ' " The disturbing collaboration of the media and
the police' accentuates the need for a bright-line rule preventing
media "ride-alongs."
While law enforcement is charged with
enforcing the law, the media has an essential role in overseeing this
administration ofjustice. The media, however, should be concerned
with accurately reporting police conduct, not with encouraging the
growth of ratings through intrusive and privacy-destroying press
coverage. The courts must ensure that the media's focus remains on
the former objective and not the latter.
A bright-line rule was also necessary because the value of the
Fourth Amendment lies in its power to prevent, and not necessarily
redress, unlawful government searches. 55 Furthermore, privacy torts
have failed to adequately protect the privacy interests of individuals.'5
If the Supreme Court had established a balancing test subject to the
discretion of the searching officer, in lieu of a clear standard, the
privacy protections guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment would
have been significantly diminished.'
The Supreme Court also has
I& at 684-85.
152 See Middleton, supra note 146, at 280-81.
153 See 1 HALL, supra note 2, § 1:7, at 13 (noting that the Supreme Court has
been
attempting to adopt bright-line search and seizure rules in order to make Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence easier for the police and courts to apply).
1 See Ransom, supra note 4, at 357. Joint home invasions by the police and media
raise issues about the objectivity of the press and self-interest of the police. See id.
155 See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 766 n.12 ("The Amendment
is designed
to prevent, not simply to redress, unlawful police action.").
See Diane L. Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and
Brandeis's Ptivacy Tor; 68 CORNELL L. REv. 291, 362 (1983) (arguing that in the 90
years since Warren and Brandeis advocated a right to privacy, the private-facts tort
has failed to provide effective redress for plaintiffs).
157 At least one expert believes that balancing tests tend to erode the rights that
they are charged with protecting. See Nadine Strossen, The Fourth Amendment in the
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recognized the need for clear standards in order to give police the
necessary guidance in carrying out their law enforcement duties
within constitutional boundaries."
Wilson is a clear victory for the sanctity of the home and Fourth
Amendment rights. Wilson also reflects a welcome use of bright-line
rules that delineate the rights of individuals and establish guidelines
and standards for police to follow. In an era when people are
becoming increasingly vulnerable to technological intrusion, Wilson
correctly emphasizes the sanctity of the home and refuses to "open
wide the back door to idle or prurient curiosity. " "
Michael Simitz

Balance: Accurately Setting the Scales Through the Least Intrusive Alternative Analysis, 63
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1173, 1174-75 (1988). Strossen argues that the balancing tests that the
Supreme Court employs have steadily reduced the scope of privacy protected by the
Fourth Amendment. See id. at 1174-75. Strossen stresses the need for categorical,
bright-line rules, instead of ad-hoc balancing tests, to ensure that Fourth
Amendment rights are adequately protected. See i. at 1175-76.
M See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213 (1979). The Court averred that
"the protections intended by the Framers could all too easily disappear in the
consideration and balancing of the multifarious circumstances presented by different
cases, especially when that balancing may be done in the first instance by police." i.
at 213. The Court also pointed out that the police need a specific guide and
standard to follow because the police "have only limited time and expertise to reflect
on and balance the social and individual interests involved in the specific
circumstances they confront." Id. at 213-14.
159 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 5, at 220.

